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lN TH'E SUPREME COURT
1

of the

STATE OF UT AH
.J Al\1J£S A. McINTOSH, rrrustee in
Bankruptcy, Estate of BOUNTIFUL
MA'l'ERIALS & CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, Inc., B-446-65,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
UNITED STA'l1ES OF AMERICA
Defendant and Respondent.'

Case No.
11078

APPJ£LLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMJ£Nrr OF THI£ NATURJ£ OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein Plaintiff, the Trustee in
Bankruptcy for the Estate of Bountiful Materials and
Construction Company, Inc., sought to invalidate the
claimed lien of the Small Business Administration, an
Agency of the United States Government, on property
which had come into his possession, as trustee. The
lien was claimed by virtue of an "after-acquired" clause
in the chattel mortgagP.
DISPOSITION IN '11HJ£ LOWER COURT
The Court ruled that the after-acquired provisions
of the Small Business Administration chattel mortgage
wen~ su1wrior to the right1' of Plaintiff, and entered.
jndgnwnt in favor of defendant.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Appellant asks that the judgment of
the Lower Court be reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is the Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estate of Bountiful Materials and Construction Company,
Inc., B-446-G5, wherein the voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah on April 21, 1965.
After being appointed rrrustee, Plaintiff claimed
title to the following personal property:
Hydraulic press, shop built
Gabriel Gas Fire Boiler, Model M-5
Century vVater Softener, Model 110 F APT
Brunt>r ~Water Filter, l\fodd AClOAB
Dayton Grinder, Model 12853
Delta Drill Press, Motor No. 9000
1959 International Truck, Model AC-180
Krane Kar
Paint Air Uompressor and accessories
Office Desk
1962 Chevrolet Truck, G cyl 2 ton Serial #2C653K141-014
Wooden Office Building located at 4042 West 2100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah
Plaintiff has sold all of the property except the
Boiler, Water Softener, Water Filter and Office Desk,
for a total sum of $2,590.00. Of that amount $1,500.00
was received for the 1962 Uhevrolet truck.

On May 20, 19G3, Bountiful Materials and Construction Company [nc. executed in favor of the Small
Business Administration a Chattel Mortgage and After
Acquired Property Agreement. The chattel mortgage
contained the following provisions:
'rhat Mortgagor hereby mortgages ... and any
and all personal property, of like kind and character, hereafter acquired by Mortgagor and used
or placed in or upon the above-described premises and elsewhere.
Any additional property of like nature to the
property herein mortgaged, hereafter acquired
by Mortgagor, shall forthwith and without further act, be and become subject to the lien of
this mortgage.
The After Acquired Property Agreement, a copy
of which is part of the record before this Court, merely
reaffirms the agreement that after-acquired property
should be subject to the lien.
A copy of the chattel mortgage was filed with the
Nalt Lake County Recorder on May 27, 1963.
The personal property described above was acquired
bv Bountiful Materials and Construction Company, Inc.
after the execution of the chattel mortgage and After
Acquired Property Agreement.
On April 5, 1965, Bountiful Materials and Construction Company, Inc. executed, in favor of the Small
Business Administration, a chattel mortgage, specifically describing the property in question. A copy of this
chattel mortgagt> was filed with the Salt Lake County
Hecorder on April 5, l!:Jo5, and a copy filed with the
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Utah State Tax Commission on April 23, 1965. No additional mone>' was given by the Small Business Administration for the April 5, 1965 chattel mortgage,
however it agreed to forbear foreclosing its 1963 mortgage.
On April 21, 1965, the date of the filing of the
petition in Bankruptcy, Bountiful Materials and Construction Company, Inc. had possession of the personal
property in question, the same being located at 4042
West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The obligation due to the Small Business Administration exceeds the value of the personal property in
question.
Plaintiff claims that he is the owner of the personal
property in question free and clear of any lien of the
Small Business Administration, for the following reasons:
A. rrhe execution and lwrfection of the chattel
mortgage dated April 5, 1965, was a preference within
the meaning of Section GO of the Bankruptcy Act, and
therefore invabd as it affrcts Plaintiff Trustee.
B. The provision::; of the chattel mortgage dated
May 20, 1963, which provide for a lien on after-acquired
property, and the After Acquired Property Agreement
dated May 20, 1963, are both invalid, and are not enforceablP agreements again::;t Plaintiff Trustee in the
State of Utah.

5
C. 1f tlH• after-at(1uir<'d property provisions of the
chattPJ rnortgag<' and tl11:· After Acquired Property
Agret•rnt>nt are ,-alid, thP lien on the 1962 Chevrolet
'rruck is still im-alid as it effects Plaintiff Trustee since
'
a cop:- of tlH· ehattd mortgage was not filed with the
Utah 8tate Tax Commission until April 23, 1965, two
days after the bankruptcy petition was filed.
Defendant admits that the execution and perfecting
of the chattel mortgage dated April 5, 1965, was a technical preference within the meaning of 8ection 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act, and therefore invalid as it affects
Plaintiff Trustee.
However, defendant claims that the after-acquired
property provisions of its agreements are valid in the
8tate of Utah. Defendant also claims that Plaintiff
Trustee is Pstopped to deny and vary the terms of the
chattel mortgage and After Acquired Property Agreement, and that Plaintiff has no greater or superior rights
as '11 rustee in Bankruptcy than the mortgagor pertaining to the chattel mortgage and the After Acquired
Property Agreement.
The parties stipulated to the foregoing facts and
the following issues of law:
A. Are the after-acqnired property provisions m
the chattel mortgage dated May 20, 1963, and the After
Acquired Property Agreement dated May 20, 1963, valid
in the t:-ltate of Utah, and do they create a lien on personal prop<:>rt)- superior to the interest of Plaintiff
'11 rustee "?
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B. If the after-acquired property provisions are
valid and do create a lien generally superior to the
interest of the Plaintiff Trustee, is the lien on the 1962
Chevrolet Truck void for failure to file a copy of the
same with the Utah State Tax Commission prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition?
C. Is plaintiff estopped to deny and vary the terms
of the chattel mortgage dated May 20, 1963, and the
After Acquired Property Agreement?
The Lower Court ruled in favor of the Defendant
on all issues of law.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN THE
CHATTEL MORTGAGE DATED MAY 20, 1963 AND THE
AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY AGREEMENT DATED MAY
20, 1963 ARE VALID IN THE STATE OF UTAH AND CREATED A LIEN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY SUPERIOR TO
THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE.

Since April 21, 19G5, the date of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy by Bountiful Materials and Construction Company, Inc., Section 70 of the Bankruptcy
Act (11 U.S.C. section 110) has been amended to
strengthen the position of the trustee, but on that date
the second sentence of Section 70c read as follows:
The Trustee, as to all property, whether or not
coming into possession or control of the court,
upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings
at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested
as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon
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by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists.
Therefore, the Plaintiff rrrnstee's rights to the chattels are those which the laws of the State of Utah would
allow to a supposed creditor of the bankrupt who had,
at the date of bankruptcy, completed the legal or equitable processes for perfection of a lien upon all of the
property available for the satisfaction of his claim
against the bankrupt. Commercial Credit Company, Inc.
vs. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940). See 4A Collier
on Bankruptcy, Section 70.79, et seq. Also, the determination of the validity of a chattel mortgage on afteracquired property, as against a trustee in bankruptcy
is dependent upon the law of the state where the property is situated when acquired. Bussert vs. Quinlan, 267
F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1959). See 4A Collier on Bankruptcy,
:Section 70.82.
The authorities throughout the United States are
in conflict concerning the validity and effect of afteracquired clauses. See 4A Collier on Bankruptcy, Section
70.82; 15 Am Jitr 2d, Chattel Mortgages, Sections 24,
25, 26, 53, 57, 67, 68, 70 and 71. The States seem to
have reached five different conclusions. One group takes
the view that a properly recorded chattel mortgage containing an after-acquired clause will prevail over all
subsequent parties, including purchasers, general creditors and lien creditors. Another group takes the view
that such a chattel mortgage will prevail over simple
creditors and purchasers with notice, but not against
thP legal lien of an attaching or execution creditor unless
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the mortgage taket:> pot:>SPt:>t:>ion prior to such lien. Another group taket:> the view that such a chattel mortgage
will not be valid until the mortgagee takes possession
of the chattel. Some states permit such chattel mortgages
by statute. ln some Htates after-acquired property
clauses are of absolutely no effect.
The reasoning behind decisionH upholding the validity of such clauses include: (a) Statutory authority, (b)
the creation of an equitable lien under the maxim that
equity considers that as done which ought to be done,
and (c) the rnortgagt- is an executory contract, and the
lien attaches when the property is acquired.
Those States giving no effect to after-acquired property clauses base their decisions on the common law
rule that nothing can be mortgaged so as to affect the
rights of suhst'quent purchasers and creditors which is
not in existence at the date of the mortgage, or does
not at the time actually belong to the mortgagor, or
potentially belong to him incident to other property then
in existence and belonging to him, 15 Am Jur 2d, Chattel
Mortgages, Section 24.
Counsel for Plaintiff has found no cases decided
by the Utah Supreme Court ruling on the question of
after-acquired clauses.
Prior to January l, 19G6, the statutes of the State
of Utah were silent on after-acquired clauses. On that
date the Utah Uniform Commercial Code became effective. Section 70A-9-204 t:>pecifically authorizes a security
interest in after-acquired property.

While the Utah Statutes were specifically silent on
the question of after-ac<-1uired clauses, some sections may
shed a little light on tlw problem. Sl'ction 9-1-1 through
!)-1-17 Utah Code Annotated (1953), although now revealed, covered the law on the execution, filing for record, and foreclosure of chattel mortgages, and must
therefore be the law governing the chattel mortgage in
the instant case. Section 9-1-1 covers the requisites for
Yalidity of chattel mortgages, but does not discuss afteracquired property. Section 9-1-5 through 9-1-12 covers
foreclosure procedures. Section 9-1-8 covering the notice
of foreclosure sales provides:
1£very such notice shall specify: First, the date
of the mortgage and where filed; second, the
names of the mortgagor and mortgagee, and of
the assignee of the mortgagee, if any; third, the
amount claimed to be due thereon at the time of
the first publication or posting of such notice;
fourth, a description of the mortgaged property
conforming substantially with that contained in
the mortgage; fifth, the time and place of sale.
(Emphasis added.)
The wording emphasized certainly implies that the only
property which can be foreclosed is that which is described in the mortgage. A notice containing the words
"any and all personal property, of like kind and character, hereafter acquired by Mortgagor, and used or
placed in or upon the above described premises and
Plsewhere" would not give the required notice to the
mortgagor or to the publie of the property to be sold.
This is an indication that the legislature intended that
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the chattel mortgage be effective only against that property specifically described therein.
Of even greater importance is Section 68-3-1 Utah
Code Annotated (1953), which provides:
The common law of 1£ngland so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as
it is consistent with and adopted to the natural
and physical conditions of this state and the
necessities of the 1wople hereof, is hereby adopted,
and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of
this state.
The common law rule which invalidates claimed liens
on after-acquired property is not repugnant to, or in
conflict with, the Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution or laws of the State of Utah, nor is it
inconsistent with the natural and physical conditions
of the State of Utah or the people thereof.
A case very similar on its facts and identical on
its legal issues with the instant case is Phelps vs. Turner,
351 S.W. 2d 176 (Ky. 1961). The case involved a chattel
mortgage on after-acqnirc>d property, a subsequent bankruptcy, and the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code after the execution of the chattel mortgage, but
before the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
In affirming the 'l'rial Court's holding that the afteracq_uired clause was illegal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said:
The eourt rdied on l:Jrrndy l'allcy Grocery Cornpauy u. Patrick, :267 Ky. 768, 103 S.vV. 2d 307, 310,

11
wherein this Court in 1937 reluctantly and critically reaffirmed the common law doctrine that
mortgages on after-acquired property such as a
changing stock of goods were illegal because of
the opportunity they afforded for cheating other
creditors saying:
''If third parties dealing with the mortgagor
possess either actual or constructive notice of
such prior bona fidP transaction, we fail to see
wherein they should not be bound by the mortgage
when with such knowledge they consent to the
creation of their subsPqnent debts. But however
that may be the stare decisis rule, so overwhelmingly adopted and approyed by this and all courts,
admonishes us that we should not depart therefrom, it involving a rule of property."

We affirm the judgment on the basis of the
Sandy Valley case, comforted by the knowledge
that the Uniform Commercial Code ... , now effective in this jurisdiction, permits mortgages
on after-acquired goods."
The rule should be the same in the state of Utah.
Prior to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, a chattel
mortgage on after-ac4nired property was invalid as to
third parties.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
LIEN ON THE 1962 CHEVROLET TRUCK WAS VALID IN
VIEW OF THE FACT THAT A COPY OF THE CHATTEL
MORTGAGE WAS NOT FILED WITH THE UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION IN BANKRUPTCY.

A copy of tlw origial dmttel mortgage was not filed
with the Utah StatP 'L1ax Commission.
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Section 41-1-80, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides:
No conditional sale contract, conditional lease,
chattel mortgage, or other lien or encumbrance or
title retention instrument upon a registered vehicle, other than a lien dependent upon possession, is valid as against the creditors of an owner
acquiring a lien by levy or attachment or subsec1nent purchasc•1·s or encumhrancPrs without notice
until the requirements of sections 41-1-81 to 411-87 have been complied with.
8ections 41-1-81 to 41-1-87 provide for the filing of
copies of lien instruments with the Utah State Tax
Commission.
The effect of 41-1-80 is not in doubt or cannot be
questioned. As pointed out in argument under Point I,
Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act puts Plaintiff in the
class of persons against which an unfiled lien is invalid.
Therefore, the claimed lien of the Small Business Administration on the 19G2 Chevrolet Truck, not being filed
with the Tax Commission, is invalid.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED TO DENY AND VARY THE TERMS
OF THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE DATED MAY 20, 1963 AND
THE AFTER ACQUIRED PROPERTY AGREEMENT.

Defendant has set up an issue of estoppel, claiming
that the Plaintiff is estopped to deny and vary the terms
of the Chattel Mortgage dat<>d May 20, 1963, and the
After Acquired Property Agrec•ment. Plaintiff is not in
any way trying to vary and deny terms of the chattel
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mortgage. Plaintiff's whole i)()sition is that those terms
are invalid as they effect him.
Plaintiff does not deny that his position as a hypothetical creditor under Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act
puts him in no better position than the hypothetical
creditor who has taken some action that would set up
an estoppel. However, the stipulated facts set forth no
such action, and there is no factual or legal basis for
an estoppel.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and Appellant respectfully urges that the
claimed lien of Defendant is invalid as it effects the
Plaintiff, and asks the Court to reverse the Judgment
of the Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ALLEN & PAULSEN
John H. Allen
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
920 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

